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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

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THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR

A REPLY TO MR. ROOSEVELT

BY THE EDITOR

CONSPICUOUS among the attributes of our present Chief Magistrate, as we have remarked upon occasion, is a rare foresight distinguished by considerations of prudence with respect to his own personal prerogatives in coming years. It is without surprise, therefore, that we hear "from the White House" that Mr. Wilson does not accord with those of his partisans who resent, as unbecoming, criticism of the Administration by his living predecessors. Even if all shall go well, not so very many years will elapse before he, too, will sit upon the judgment-seat; and if by chance all should go ill, that unhappy day is distressingly close at hand; for, be it noted, from the moment a President is renominated he becomes a slave of political expediency, at least for a time. Then if the verdict be favorable he reaps the reward of the good and faithful servant, but if it be unfavorable he resumes his position, in the consoling words of Benjamin Franklin, "among the masters."

It matters little, therefore, whether the President's interpretation of the single-term declaration made at Baltimore conforms with that of its author; the contingency still remains. Clearly, Mr. Wilson could not have applied the restriction of "etiquette" to the utterances of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft

without causing misgiving with respect to himself as the leading forward-looking man of the country.

And he did well. We shall never have too many ex-Presidents ready and willing to speak from their abundance of knowledge acquired through experience. In point of fact, it happens less seldom than might be supposed that the country awaits with ill-concealed impatience the passing of a "ruler" into the ranks of the critical unemployed, upon the theory, of course, that his talents are better adapted to service in the latter capacity. A quite recent instance is in mind. Deeply, too, as all of us who are not engaged in business of one kind or another might regret the voluntary or involuntary withdrawal of our present Chief Magistrate from official occupation, none can deny the advantages which would accrue to an inexperienced President from the militant Americanism, the inspiring philosophy, and the sophisticated righteousness of his immediate predecessors. The tendency, then, of our ex-Presidents to speak their minds freely is one to be encouraged, and we welcome the recent outgivings of Mr. Roosevelt, regardless of their characteristic fan-farona.

Not that we agree with him—except as to certain phases of our Government's attitude toward bleeding Mexico, which is not now under consideration—far from it! But we yield to none in respect for and admiration of Mr. Roosevelt's distinctively American spirit and we readily acquit him of any suspicion of partisanship in dealing with matters involving patriotism. That he is, in fact, as he declares, "straight United States" nobody would think of questioning; but so are we; and so, as can be easily demonstrated in this instance, Mr. Roosevelt to the contrary notwithstanding, is President Wilson.

Mr. Roosevelt says in the *Metropolitan*:

The United States, thanks to Messrs. Wilson and Bryan, has signally failed in its duty toward Belgium. We had pledged our support to the international agreements of The Hague, which explicitly guaranteed Belgium against the very type of disaster which first befell it, and against the hideous wrongdoing which followed upon this initial disaster; but with a timid shirking of duty which has brought dishonor upon this nation, the Administration failed to utter one word in behalf of these violated agreements to which the nation had been a party.

Thanks to the Administration, the United States has been faithless to its duty and has lost the chance to gain a moral ascendancy that would have been a powerful influence for the best interests of humanity. When this, the most powerful of the neutral nations which had signed the conventions of The Hague, failed to protest against their violation,

it lost its great opportunity to take an effective stand for peace and against lawless international violence.

To judge by their actions, President Wilson and Mr. Bryan have believed that their conduct in preserving a tame and spiritless neutrality would somehow put them in a lofty position.

They have vociferated high-sounding platitudes about peace and morality in the abstract, while not venturing to say one word about the violations of The Hague Conventions by Germany at the expense of Belgium.

This is a severe—almost a savage—indictment; but is it warranted? What are the facts? In common, we assume, with his friend, Mr. St. Loe Strachey, and other English publicists whose utterances we have quoted, Mr. Roosevelt bases his animadversions upon the ground that it was and perhaps still is the duty of our Government to protest against the action of the German military forces (1) in invading Belgium, (2) in dropping bombs from air-craft, (3) in destroying historic monuments, (4) in bombarding seacoast towns, (5) in using dum-dum bullets, and (6) in planting contact mines in the high seas. Now let us consider these performances, as bearing upon our own national obligations under international law and usage, in turn:

1. *Invading Belgium.*

In considering the invasion of Belgium it should be pointed out that there is a distinction between *neutralized* States and *neutral* States, or that the neutrality of the two classes is essentially different in purpose and founded upon different principles.

The neutrality of *neutralized* States is a matter of conventional agreement between Powers who are more or less interested in preventing the State from being absorbed politically by any Power, or from becoming a base of military operations, or from otherwise assisting neighboring rival States. The agreement *imposes* a condition of permanent neutrality. It is, in fact, a guarantee not only by the neutralized State that it will not engage in aggressive warfare, but also by the other parties to the treaty that it shall not be attacked by any of them. These restraining conditions are purely contractual and are imposed and perpetuated from without. They do not exist by virtue of the rules of international law or the customs of nations, but solely by the treaties creating them.

The neutrality of a *neutral* State, on the other hand, is a condition which a nation other than the belligerents may assume voluntarily and regardless of treaty provisions upon the

outbreak of an international war. It is optional with such a nation to join in the war or to remain neutral. If it determines to choose an attitude of neutrality, then international law imposes certain rights and duties upon it as a neutral State. But this attitude may be changed at will and the neutral may enter the war on either side. It is this optional nature of the neutrality of a neutral State that distinguishes it from the permanent neutrality of a neutralized State.

It is solely with the rights and duties of a neutral State that The Hague Conventions on neutrality deal. They do not deal with the neutralization of a State or with the guarantees of the interested Powers to preserve its neutralized status. Only those Powers which are by agreement mutual guarantors of the neutralization of the State have a legal right under the agreement to complain of its violation. To the agreement of that sort in reference to Belgium the United States is not and has not been a party. It was a matter of European politics, pure and simple, with which we had no concern—an arrangement between the signatory Powers to safeguard a condition resulting from conflicting interests. It would manifestly be improper and presumptuous for this Government to complain of the violation of such a treaty of neutralization to which it was not a party in any sense.

So far, therefore, as the invasion of Belgium may be considered a breach by Germany of a guarantee to preserve the character of Belgium as a *neutralized* State, this Government has neither the legal right nor duty to protest.

In respect to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium as a *neutral* State during an international war, The Hague Conventions contain certain stipulations in Article 1 of Convention V of 1907, entitled "Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land," and in Article 1 of Convention XIII of 1907, entitled "Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare."

These articles read as follows:

The territory of neutral powers is inviolable.

(Convention V, Article 1.)

Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from any act which would, if knowingly permitted by any power, constitute a violation of neutrality.

(Convention XIII, Article 1.)

Article 20 of Convention V further provides:

The provisions of the present convention do not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention.

It is not necessary to examine into the question as to whether these treaties were in force by virtue of all the belligerents being parties as required by Article 2 of Convention V and Article 28 of Convention XIII, for the reason that, quite contrary to Mr. Roosevelt's definite assertion, *no Hague Conventions were violated by the German invasion of Belgium.*

It is admitted that if Germany, before invading the territory of Belgium, had declared war against that country, the latter would have been impressed with the character of a belligerent, to whom the provisions of Article 1 of Convention V and Article 1 of Convention XIII relative to the inviolability of neutral territory would not be applicable, and that, having exercised this sovereign right, Germany could not be charged with violating neutral territory in contravention of the terms of The Hague Conventions, but the fact that this is what happened is commonly ignored. Nevertheless, the published diplomatic correspondence shows that Germany did declare war by ultimatum and that a state of war actually existed between Germany and Belgium before German forces penetrated into the territory of the latter country.

Following the provisions of Article 1 of Hague Convention III of 1907, that hostilities must not commence "without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war," the German Government presented to the Belgian Government a note proposing, among other things, that German troops be given free passage through Belgian territory, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. Belgium declined to accede to the proposal, with full knowledge that the consequence would be war with Germany. Upon her refusal Belgium lost her neutral character, and by operation of the ultimatum became a belligerent. After this status in the relations of the two countries was reached a state of war existed and German forces began the invasion of Belgium. This may have been a violation of an agreement neutralizing Belgium, but that is a question for the parties to that agreement, not for the United States, to determine.

That it was a declaration of war against a State previously

neutralise evident, but a belligerent is not restrained by The Hague Conventions from declaring war against a neutral State for any cause which seems to it sufficient. The Conventions do not restrict such action to any stated *casus belli*. A belligerent under the present international system is at liberty to seek his own *casus belli*, and to maintain it before the world. For another neutral to protest and denounce it as unjustifiable would be to exceed the bounds of international duty and custom.

A procedure for a third party in a case of this sort is, however, laid down in The Hague Conventions. Convention I of 1907 provides in Article 3 that it is expedient and desirable that "strangers" to the dispute should on their own initiative and as far as circumstances may allow offer their good offices or mediation to the states at variance," and that "the exercise of this right can never be regarded . . . as an unfriendly act." Although Great Britain and Servia had not ratified this Convention I, yet in conformity with its provisions our Department of State on August 4th sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, and on August 5th to London, the President's offer to act in the interest of European peace, either then or at any other suitable time.

It is difficult to see what further action the United States was called upon to take or could have properly taken in the situation presented at the outbreak of the war. The President might have done less. To have done more would have been uncalled for and presumptuous in the extreme.

2. Dropping Bombs.

The dropping of bombs from air-craft was prohibited by a Declaration adopted by the Second Hague Conference in 1907, but, as it was neither signed nor ratified by France, Germany, Russia, and Servia, and was signed but not ratified by Austria-Hungary, it is not in force in the present war, since the Declaration provides that:

The present Declaration is only binding on the contracting powers in case of war between two or more of them.

It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the contracting powers, one of the belligerents is joined by a non-contracting power.

The question may be raised, however, whether the dropping of bombs from air-craft falls under the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of Hague Convention IV of 1907, which reads as follows:

The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited. (Article 25.)

The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities. (Article 26.)

Without discussing whether or not this Convention is in force, in view of the fact that, Servia never having ratified it, all belligerents are not parties to it, as required by Article 2, the question as to whether a town, village, dwelling, or building is "not defended" within the meaning of Article 25 is one of fact, which requires conclusive evidence to establish. Some have assumed that the words "not defended" are synonymous with "unfortified," but, in the ordinary use of language, "not defended" is a much broader term than "unfortified."

As to Article 26, it must be determined whether the dropping of bombs from air-craft should be classed as a "bombardment" or as an "assault." If that method of attack can be properly termed a bombardment, it must be shown affirmatively that a commander of an attacking force did not do all in his power to warn the authorities prior to a bombardment, before he can be charged with a violation of the provision. In the case of attacks by air-craft, evidence of the power to warn and of failure to do so has not been furnished.

But, even if this evidence were furnished, it may not unreasonably be asserted that in the case of aerial offense the conditions are quite different from those attending a bombardment by land batteries; that in the former case the element of surprise is essential to success; that preliminary notice would give the enemy opportunity to send his air-craft aloft to intercept the attacking force; and that a warning under these conditions would be an unreasonable requirement. If these assertions are correct, then Article 26 was never intended to apply to an aerial attack.

There appears, then, to be no substantial reason to affirm that the United States, as a party to The Hague Conventions, should enter a protest against the practice of dropping aerial bombs upon places occupied by the enemy.

It may be added that, while this discussion relates to aerial operations by the German forces, the belligerents of both sides have employed this method of attack upon the enemy.

3. *Destroying historic monuments.*

The question of the violation of the rules of land warfare relative to the immunity from attack of certain classes of buildings is raised under the following provisions in Article 27 of Convention II of The Hague Conventions of 1899:

In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.

The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.

Similar provisions were incorporated in Convention IV of 1907, with the addition between the words "charity" and "hospitals" of the words "historic monuments."

Convention II of 1899 was ratified by all of the belligerents in the present war and by the United States, but Convention IV of 1907 was not ratified by Servia.

To establish a violation of the provisions quoted from Convention II of 1899, or the similar ones of Convention IV of 1907, whichever may be considered to be in force, it is requisite to show (1) that certain of the class of buildings mentioned have been injured by bombardment; (2) that "all necessary steps" were not taken to spare them "as far as possible," (3) that they were "not being used at the same time for military purposes," and (4) that they were indicated "by distinctive and visible signs" which were notified to the assailants beforehand.

These four propositions, each of which is essential to substantiate a claim of violation of the treaty, have not been established, nor does it appear that they have even been asserted by those who charge violation of the treaty stipulations. Furthermore, the meaning of "all necessary steps" and "as far as possible" is open to a latitude of interpretation by the commander of an attacking force which involves his conception of the operations necessary to military success. Deplorable as may be the destruction of a cathedral or hospital by a bombardment, the fact alone is not sufficient to constitute a breach of The Hague Convention. The other elements establishing a wanton and needless act must be conclusively shown.

It should also be added in this connection that the treaty itself determines the remedy to be applied in case of an unjustifiable destruction of buildings of the immune class, for Article 3 of Convention IV of 1907 provides:

A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.

Obviously this article contemplates an investigation of a

more or less judicial nature as to the facts determining liability and the amount of damages sustained. A protest by a third party would be to impute guilt and to charge liability without a full investigation of the facts.

4. *Bombarding seacoast towns.*

The bombardment of seacoast towns by the naval forces of a belligerent is dealt with in the following articles of Convention IX of 1907:

Article 1. The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden.

A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbor.

Article 2. Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war *matériel*, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbor, are not, however, included in this prohibition. The commander of a naval force may destroy them with artillery, after a summons followed by a reasonable time in waiting, if all other means are impossible, and when the local authorities have not themselves destroyed them within the time fixed.

He incurs no responsibility for any unavoidable damage which may be caused by a bombardment under such circumstances.

If for military reasons immediate action is necessary, and no delay can be allowed the enemy, it is understood that the prohibition to bombard the undefended town holds good, as in the case given in paragraph 1, and that the commander shall take all due measures in order that the town may suffer as little as possible.

Article 6. If the military situation permits, the commander of the attacking naval force before commencing the bombardment, must do his utmost to warn the authorities.

This Convention was ratified by the United States and by the belligerents except Servia, Turkey, and Montenegro.

Without raising the question of the nullifying effect upon the Convention of its non-ratification by these three belligerents, it may be pointed out that the word "undefended" is not an exact term, but may be variously interpreted. If a camp or barracks for troops is maintained, or if there is a depot for military or naval supplies, it is debatable whether or not the town can be classed as "undefended" in the sense in which the word is used in the treaty.

At all events, it must be shown that the port or town was undefended when bombarded or that the commander of the attacking force failed to perform his full duty in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Thus far evidence

establishing either of these facts, which appear necessary to make out a violation of the treaty, has not been produced.

5. *Using dum-dum bullets.*

The use of expanding bullets was first treated at The Hague Conference in 1899, and a provision relative thereto was inserted in a declaration of the Conference in the following language:

The contracting parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions.

This declaration was ratified or adhered to by all of the present belligerents, but it was never signed or ratified by the United States. The United States, therefore, not being a party to the Declaration, would have no duty or right to interfere in case of violation of its provisions by any of the ratifying or adhering Powers.

It may be thought that Hague Convention IV of 1907, relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 23e, is broad enough to prohibit the use of expanding bullets. This article reads as follows:

In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions, it is especially forbidden

e. To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.

This article is identical with Article 23e of Convention II of 1899, which was concluded at the same time as the Declaration of 1899 just quoted. It appears to be conclusive, therefore, that the two provisions relate to different matters, for otherwise it would have been unnecessary to execute two separate agreements. That the agreements were regarded by the Conference as distinct is shown by the use in Article 23e of the words "In addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions." Corroborative of this is the fact that Great Britain did not adhere to the Declaration of 1899 until August 30, 1907, while The Hague Conference was in session and was considering Convention IV, of which Article 23e is a part. The conclusion is inevitable that the prohibition of the use of expanding bullets depends upon the provisions of the Declaration of 1899, to which, as already pointed out, the United States is not a party.

6. *Laying submarine contact mines.*

Reference to the laying of submarine contact mines on the

high seas seems unnecessary, in view of the fact that the belligerents on both sides have apparently employed this method of naval warfare. It should, however, be pointed out that Russia neither signed nor ratified Convention VIII of 1907 (it was signed, but not ratified by Turkey or Montenegro) which restricts the use of such mines, so that the provisions of the Convention do not apply in the present war.

It is important to note, in connection with this general subject of the violation of the rules of war on land and sea, which are laid down in The Hague Conventions, that the belligerents on both sides of the great European conflict have repeatedly called to the attention of the world the disregard of their opponents for the rules of humane warfare recognized by international usage and treaty stipulations.

The frequency of these charges and the denials of the Governments charged indicate the influence which the public opinion of the world exerts upon the conduct of the belligerents, and shows their earnest desire to avoid the condemnation of civilization on the charge of inhumanity and wanton brutality.

While the conflict of evidence and the impossibility of impartial investigation at the present time prevent neutral nations from determining the truth or falsity of the charges and counter-charges, the denials and defenses, which have been made by the belligerents, and, therefore, furnish no basis for protest, the time will undoubtedly come when the truth as to these charges can be conclusively shown and the responsibility can be measured by the standard of international law and justice. The guilty will then inevitably incur the odium of the civilized world, and those falsely charged will be vindicated. It is this future judgment of enlightened nations, as clearly set forth by President Wilson, which to-day must restrain the warring Powers from inhuman practices, rather than condemnation by neutral Powers for charges made in the heat of conflict and based upon incomplete knowledge of all the circumstances.

In view of the simple facts set forth above, the abstract question as to whether it is the right and duty of the United States, in any case, to protest against a violation of a Hague Convention need hardly be considered. Since, however, Mr. Roosevelt bases his condemnation of the Government entirely upon his assumption that this obligation does exist, it is well to note that no such right or duty is set forth affirmatively in any document signed at The Hague. President Roosevelt's own

delegates, moreover, took particular care to absolve the United States from the obligation which he now takes for granted when they appended to the agreement the following explicit reservation:

Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign State.

The purpose of this proviso was, of course, to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine, which guarantees our non-interference in European politics in return for the non-interference of foreign nations on this hemisphere. Surely Mr. Roosevelt must have been aware of this when he "ordered the signature of the United States to these Conventions," and no less surely now, if he will stop and think, he must realize that the assumption by this Government of an obligation as guarantor of the neutrality or independence of any foreign State would involve complete abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine—a consummation which he, of all men, would be the last to desire or to concede.

There remains the broader and less tangible ground of "duty to humanity" so naturally and readily seized upon as a basis of criticism by one who invariably places "social justice" high above the written law.

"There is something essentially ignoble," Mr. Roosevelt writes, "in having failed to stand up in generous and manly fashion for the rights of others who were grievously wronged, in having failed to do our duty, which we were pledged to perform, on behalf of humanity." And he adds:

The failure of Messrs. Wilson and Bryan to do their duty to humanity and to carry out the obligations of this nation in the case of Belgium has put us at a dreadful disadvantage as regards every protest made on behalf of our own interests.

This is Our Colonel at his best; none other would have the audacity to marry altruism and self-interest at the altar of misstatement. We have already shown beyond the possibility of question that by President Roosevelt's own direction the United States not only did not assume, but explicitly disavowed, any obligation whatever "in the case of Belgium." We now might fittingly inquire whether the safeguarding of "our own interests" under the pretense of serving "humanity" might

not be justly pronounced something far more "essentially ignoble" than anything "Messrs. Wilson and Bryan" have done. It might also be well to remind Mr. Roosevelt that even he once swore solemnly, even though somewhat tentatively if we may judge from his subsequent acts, to "preserve, protect, and defend"—what? "The rights of others grievously wronged"? Or the paradox of "humane" warfare? No. "The Constitution of the United States," and inferentially in hardly less degree the Great Tradition defined by George Washington in a letter to Patrick Henry in these words:

My ardent desire and my aim has been to comply strictly with all our engagements, foreign and domestic, and to keep the United States free from political connection with every other country, to see them independent of all and under the influence of none. In a word, I want an American character that the Powers of Europe may be convinced that we act for ourselves and not for others. This, in my judgment, is the only way to be respected abroad and happy at home, and not, by becoming partisans of Great Britain or France, create dissension, disturb the public tranquillity, and destroy, perhaps forever, the cement which binds the Union.

It is not too much to say in truth, and not less than should be said in fairness and grateful appreciation, that the guidance of our Ship of State by Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing through the whirling pools of this European conflict has never, in essential sagacity, resolution, and patience, been surpassed in the history of the Republic.

RESPONSES FROM ENGLAND

THE editorials and letters which we reprint elsewhere in this number afford gratifying evidence that our recent "Letter to *The Times*" not only struck a popular chord at home, but served well its primary purpose to clear the atmosphere abroad. It is but natural, perhaps, that *The Outlook* should hold the defeat of the Ship Purchase Bill as "justification" of its own opposition rather than of that of the American Congress, but upon the whole its response is commendably frank and friendly. We can take no exception, moreover, to its conclusion to this effect:

The war can be ended in two ways: by the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of vigorous lives, or by an economic pressure which will deny the enemy sufficient of the essential sinews of war. To help to bring about the more merciful consummation is Great Britain's present object. And we hold that it is the duty of the United States as

a civilizing Power to assist us, even if the obligation entails material losses and bars the way to great profits. We are sacrificing everything in the cause of international peace and the right of small nations to work out their own destinies. Is it too much to ask the other great representative of the English-speaking race to share that burden to the extent of submitting to commercial restrictions, the principle of which is not contested?

To this it suffices to say that we are submitting to such restrictions without a murmur; it is only those the principle of which is contested upon established international practice that our Government objects to. And in doing this we are rendering England the greatest conceivable service as of the present as well as of the future. If we should once admit the right of the Allies to forbid our sending foodstuffs to Germany, how could we deny the justice of Germany's insistence that we should apply the same principle to England? And what would happen to the English people then? Surely, too, our British friends must realize that only the strictest adherence to international law makes it possible for us to furnish to the Allies the vast quantities of war munitions without which they could not hope to win. If our sole purpose was to "end the war," we could achieve it most effectually by establishing the complete embargo so strenuously urged by our hyphenated citizens, but the practically certain outcome would hardly be pleasing to England.

It is well, moreover, for Britons to consider that, despite the unprecedented magnitude of this conflict, the world is not likely to come to an end. With the future—especially of isolated England—in mind, then, it behooves somebody to stand for established order and observance of usage. That is what the United States is doing and all it is doing, to the immeasurable incidental advantage to Great Britain both in time present and in times to come. If this fact cannot be made clear to the English mind, nothing that we could do, short of direct participation in their behalf, would satisfy the friends whose hope of an early success is no stronger than our own.

Evidences that broad-minded and far-seeing public journals like *The Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Glasgow Herald*, and *The Outlook* appreciate the situation have been made manifest. That the like cannot be said of *The Spectator*, in view of its previous friendliness to this country, is a cause of regret. If Mr. Hutton were still living, we are convinced that hasty commission of an unconscionable blunder such as appeared in

"The Great Danger" would be atoned for promptly by frank acknowledgment of the error. But Mr. Strachey seems far more concerned by the need of justifying Mr. Strachey than by softening asperities which he pretends to deplore. Commenting upon the sharp criticisms evoked from both England and America, he declares determinedly that he has "no intention of apologizing in any way for that article or of withdrawing in any degree from the position which we there took up." Graciously conceding, however, that "it does appear that in some instances we failed to make our meaning clear," he proceeds forthwith to cultivate the fraternal feeling which he so ardently desires by beginning a lecture to President Wilson with the sneering allusion—"if ears so mighty can catch the feeble whispers of the Press."

The temptation to play with overweening conceit is seldom resistible, but in this instance sincerity clearly calls for restraint. Nor, in consideration of protests from its contemporaries that *The Spectator* no longer voices the real sentiment of the English people and of its abrupt forfeiture of prestige in this country and Canada, would we deprive it of the comfort which it derives from "a quiet Boston gentleman" whom it quotes as saying, "Ever since the war broke out I have been sorry that we are no longer a British colony." That Mr. Strachey should admit that "we should be ingrates indeed" if this observation "did not touch us profoundly" is most consoling; so there let us leave him, with thanks to the quiet Boston gentleman whose ancestors apparently withheld their gracious presence from a certain tea-party in Boston harbor which we recall with great reluctance and due apologies.

THE SENATOR AND THE KAISER

WE report with ill-concealed satisfaction that Former-Senator Albert J. Beveridge has returned from the front unharmed. He went abroad, it will be recalled, to apply X-rays to the situation for subsequent illumination of the pages of our esteemed *Collier's*. We commend the results to our readers. Although more shrewdly skilled in painting with tongue than with pen, Mr. Beveridge adopted a method of procedure which many of our professionals might emulate to advantage. He first acquired his facts—always a desirable thing to do—then thought about them and finally recorded them far from the madding

crowd, where freedom from entangling alliances was guaranteed. In a word, he passed from Germany to Switzerland in order, as he wrote to the editor, "to be out of an atmosphere which might subconsciously influence the mind" and "in neutral surroundings far enough away to permit the getting of a proper perspective."

With this announcement before our eyes we turned with zest to the article alluringly entitled "A Visit to the Kaiser." We were well aware that the War Lord had not been at home to correspondents for some time, but it remained for the Senator, writing retrospectively, oddly enough, to inform us that "the Emperor had not then, *nor has he yet*, received any foreigner since the war began." Be that as it may, we do not question the assertion that Mr. Beveridge was summoned from a depot restaurant by a booted and spurred officer to meet His Majesty in His German Garden. Accompanied by an aide, he passed through the gateway and, perceiving the Kaiser walking with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, he approached on foot. At the moment of introduction he excused himself for an instant and drew from his vest pocket a faithful timepiece, thus enabling him to record with painstaking accuracy, "At exactly fifteen minutes before three o'clock I was presented to His Majesty."

There was no ceremony, neither kneeling. The Emperor wore "the simple uniform of the field," the Chancellor was in khaki and boots and cap, and the Senator, having "just come from the trenches," meaning the depot restaurant, was "still dressed in riding-clothes"—the usual costume of the cavalry in ditches. After looking one another over, they started for a stroll through the garden, closely followed by sturdy attendants bearing a suitable background, as per the picture herewith reproduced from *Collier's* itself. When the time came for separation the Senator, again excusing himself, looked at his watch and was "particularly struck" by the fact that it was "exactly fifteen minutes before five o'clock." That means that the distinguished trio walked two solid hours—a circumstance which the Senator mentions "only because of the perfect opportunity to observe the German Emperor and because so long a walk and conversation after a hard forenoon's work was a test of his physical endurance."

Apparently, therefore, there was talking as well as walking, but whose conversation it was that constituted a test of His Majesty's physical endurance can only be imagined. There is



PAUS

By Courtesy of Collier's.

THE CHANCELLOR

THE KAISER

THE SENATOR

not a line on the two pages indicating that the Emperor said a word himself, and the Chancellor certainly looks grumpy enough in the picture. Probably the Senator started first, but even so it would seem as if one of them might have squeezed in a *Wie gehts* or two.

It was not an interview, anyway; it was just a visit such as they make out in Indiana; and we have no right to intrude upon royal confidences, even though they do take the form of a monologue; but we miss our guess if each of those three has not something now to think about for the rest of his days.

THE FAILURE OF THE RAIDERS

COMMERCE-RAIDING is the conspicuous failure of the war. The last of the German destroyers has sought asylum in American waters, and presumably has thus ended her career. It is thus possible to sum up and to appraise the work of those formidable cruisers, which have held the seas for months with a vigilance, an alertness, an intrepidity, a versatile resourcefulness, and a technical skill in seamanship for which we shall find few parallels and probably no superiors in the annals of naval war; a fact which has been handsomely recognized by the countrymen of Drake and Dundonald. We must also bear in mind that their operations have been directed against a commerce of unapproached magnitude and, because of its vast distribution, of singular vulnerability. "What a city to loot!" exclaimed Marshal Blücher at his first sight of London. "What a commerce to raid!" might well have been the enraptured thought of the commander of each of these German cruisers as he set out against the vessels of the Allies.

What, then, is the roll of destruction? Accounts do not exactly agree. The British Admiralty reports that from the beginning of the war to March 10th only 88 British vessels were captured or destroyed. The German Government puts the number down to March 1st at 111. It may be that the latter figures include vessels of all the Allies—French, Russian, and Belgian as well as British, or that the Germans count fishing-craft, which were omitted from the British tables. Let us take the larger numbers. Beyond doubt, 111 vessels in seven months are a good many. But what are they in comparison with the whole commerce against which the raids were directed? There were at the beginning of the war more than 12,000 merchant

vessels under the British flag, besides 1,500 under the French, 1,300 under the Russian, and nearly 200 under the Belgian flag. To lose 111 seems a heavy loss. To lose less than one per cent. of the whole seems trifling and negligible. Moreover, despite these losses, there are doubtless more British ships afloat to-day than there were at the outbreak of the war; for while that country has been losing them to German raiders at the rate of 16 a month, she has been building new ones at the rate of 50 a month. In place of the 111 lost she has put 420 new and better vessels into commission.

Note, too, that the effect upon British commerce has been practically *nil*. British liners have been running almost upon schedule time. There has been no suspension of trade with any part of the world save with the belligerents and with some coasts within the war zone. British intercourse with the colonies in all parts of the world, and with nearly all neutral nations, has remained unimpaired and undisturbed. The dream of "driving British commerce from the seas" has proved vain, if ever it was cherished. Mines and submarines have undoubtedly done much harm, but their operations have been confined to coast waters. In the world at large British commerce has been scarcely affected by the raiders.

It will be interesting to contrast these results with the achievements of Confederate commerce-destroyers in our own Civil War. Besides a few minor vessels, there were four notable cruisers, built new for the purpose in British dockyards. These were the *No. 290*, the *Oreto*, the *Sea King*, and the *Atalanta*, which, after they had been turned over to the Confederate navy, for which they had from the first been designed, were renamed respectively the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, the *Shenandoah*, and the *Tallahassee*. They had—two of them, at least—longer careers than the German cruisers have enjoyed. The *Alabama* was at work from August 24, 1862, to June 19, 1864, when she was sunk by the *Kearsarge* off Cherbourg. The *Florida* lasted from August 7, 1862, to October 7, 1864, when she was seized at Bahia in flagrant violation of Brazilian neutrality. The *Shenandoah* lasted from October 8, 1864, and the *Tallahassee* from August 6, 1864, to the end of the war, when the one was surrendered to the British Government and the other was sold to Japan. In those periods, what were the losses inflicted upon Federal commerce? Here are the numbers of vessels taken and their values, as adjudicated by the Geneva tribunal:

<i>Alabama</i>	58	vessels.....	\$6,547,609.86
<i>Florida</i>	38	“	3,698,609.34
<i>Shenandoah</i>	40	“	6,488,320.31
<i>Tallahassee</i>	17	“	579,955.55

Thus these four Confederate cruisers disposed of 153 vessels, of a value of \$17,314,495.06. That may seem little larger than the work of the Germans; perhaps actually smaller in view of the much greater time during which the *Alabama* and *Florida* were at large. But it was vastly larger than the German achievement in proportion to the whole volume of American commerce, for, considerable as was our ante-bellum marine, it was not comparable with that of the British Empire to-day. It was also immeasurably greater than the German achievement in its effect upon commerce, for there is no exaggeration in saying that it drove the American mercantile marine out of existence. Practically all vessels which were not seized or destroyed by the raiders were sold or transferred to other flags. Save on ships of war, the American flag disappeared from the high seas.

Now all this is said not at all in disparagement of the skill and daring of the commanders of the German cruisers, but rather as an indication that the times have changed and naval conditions have changed with them, so that commerce-destroying has become chiefly a thing of the past save to the nation which has control of the sea. Given command of the sea, and it is easy to fetter or to destroy the enemy's commerce, as Germany's has been dealt with in this war by the Allies. For a nation which has no control of the sea to harass to any great extent the commerce of the nation which has that control is no longer possible. The change is due principally to two causes: one is the development of the cruiser into a highly organized piece of machinery, continually in need of fuel and other supplies of the best quality and occasionally in need of being overhauled for repairs. The *Alabama* could cruise for weeks at a time under sail, reserving her coal for use in emergencies of pursuit or flight, and all needed repairs could be made by her own men as she cruised. In no such fashion can a *Karlsruhe* or an *Eitel Friedrich* be managed. The other cause is, of course, the invention of wireless telegraphy, which prevents those operations of secrecy and surprise which of old were so formidable and to which the Confederate cruisers owed much of their success in evading capture and in themselves making captures of prizes. Marconi's device does away with most of that, and compels the cruiser to pursue her ways chiefly in the sight of the whole world.

The pursued merchantman can send out her etheric cry for help, and if it does not summon succor it may at least give knowledge of where the raider is at work, as a warning to other merchantmen and as a "view halloo" to the avenging cruisers which are on the raider's track.

The story of these German cruisers is, then, a demonstration of the futility of striving to continue in these days the practices which were successful in other days and other conditions. As feats of seamanship and romantic daring the German exploits have been superb. As military achievements, affecting the progress and destinies of the war, they have been the veriest ciphers. The fact is emphasized that security depends upon command of the sea. That maintained, commerce is safe. That lost, commerce is lost, and lost, too, is the ability to do serious harm to the commerce of the foe. Those are the considerations which this ending of the German commerce-destroying raids should bring sharply home to the mind of every nation which has or hopes to have an important mercantile marine and which is planning to develop a naval efficiency adequate to its needs. This latest object-lesson in sea-power should not be lost to the nation which gave to the world its best history of that same factor.

THE PASSING OF MAY-DAY .

MAY-DAY as a fearsome rubric of the politico-social calendar is now a thing of the past, but still profitable for remembrance. It was only a few years ago that its advent was regarded with apprehension and actual trepidation by most of the Governments of Continental Europe. In Paris, Berlin, Brussels, and other great industrial capitals, special laws or orders were promulgated for its regulation. Full forces of police were held in instant readiness, often supplemented with strong detachments of the military; and these more than once were, or seemed to be, needed to hold in check the turbulent passions of the populace. Yet never once was there any considerable realization of governmental fears, and it may be doubted whether there was ever really a tithe of the danger which men in their anxious minds imagined. And in late years May-day has been a negligible date.

Its history has been, in fact, a congruous part of the history of that much-exaggerated organization to which the world owed the observance of May-day, namely, the "International

Working-men's Association," commonly called the "*Internationale*." This was once regarded as a "red peril" which was looming over not only the whole of Europe, but also America as well, from the Black Sea to the Golden Gate. Men spoke its dreaded name in whispers, with mingled awe and abhorrence, as that of a mysterious, elusive, irresistible force presaging the wreck of matter and the crush of worlds. Yet the thing was never really one-hundredth part as bad as it was supposed to be, if, indeed, it was bad at all; it lasted only a dozen years; and the fright which it gave to all Europe was nothing but the result of one of the most colossal bits of "bluffing" on record.

Strangely enough, Louis Napoleon was primarily responsible for the formation of the "*Internationale*," when he sent, at his own expense, a lot of French working-men over to the World's Fair in London in 1862. He sent them partly to study industrial object-lessons at the Fair, and partly to cultivate closer relations between the two nations. They did both, and they also suggested to the British working-men the formation of an international society for the promotion of their general welfare. Some affected to have derived the idea from Zeno the Stoic, centuries before; others, more plausibly, from the "League of the Just" which German exiles had founded in Paris in 1836, and which Karl Marx had transformed into his "Communist League" in 1847. At any rate, the thing was organized at a great meeting in London in September, 1864, over which Professor Beesly presided and of which Marx and Mazzini were prominent members. It was such a gathering as would then have been permitted in few other European countries; yet most of its utterances were such as would now be regarded as somewhat reactionary and savoring of "stand-pat" conservatism.

Mazzini was first intrusted with the task of formulating a constitution for the association. But, being a political rather than an industrial reformer, he filled it so full of political theories and so neglected economics that his work was rejected, and Marx was commissioned to do it over again. He was successful, and he remained the directing spirit of the organization during its whole career. Under such auspices the association began well. Its first general congress was at Geneva in 1866, and in the next year it made its influence felt in aiding the bronze-workers of Paris to win a strike; and also in aiding British working-men in their efforts to exclude the cheaper Continental labor from that country—the latter an inconsistent performance, some

thought, for an "international" body which professed to disregard all national distinctions. By this time it had attracted world-wide attention, and when its second congress met at Lausanne in 1867 serious statesmen spoke of it as Romans might have spoken of the coming of the Goths or the Huns, and gravely questioned whether there ought not to be concerted action by the Powers for its suppression. It was supposed to comprise the whole proletariat of Europe, to be concerned in every revolutionary movement, and to be aiming at the utter and universal subversion of society and government. When in 1868 Belgium permitted the holding of its third congress at Brussels, the first outside of Switzerland, she was reproved for turning traitor to Europe.

The "*Internationale*" owed its prestige, however, to its supposed possibilities and to the fears of its opponents, rather than to any actual deeds or power. It probably never had more than 50,000 members; certainly never so many as 100,000. Its organization was loose and its funds scanty. Moreover, its programmes were at first moderate. At Geneva in 1866 it called for an eight-hour day, co-operation, and intellectual and technical education for working-people, and the next year it added the ownership of railroads and other transportation lines by the State—a system which has now prevailed in Europe for many years. In 1868 it called for the nationalization of mines, forests, and indeed of land generally; called for a universal strike against war; and argued that labor should have all the profits of industry, and capital none. All of these demands have now long been commonplace, and though they are not granted, the advocacy of them no longer horrifies the world. Finally, at its fourth congress at Basel, in 1869, it reaffirmed all that had gone before, and added that the right of inheriting property should be abolished. This last extreme demand was adopted by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-three, with seven-teen delegates not voting.

The disagreement over this question marked the beginning of the end. Other divergencies arose. Prince Kropotkin and Bakunin led the extreme wing, and Marx the moderate. British workmen preferred their own trade-unions. In Germany a law forbade corporate action. America was too remote for successful co-operation with Europe. At The Hague in 1872 there was an open rupture. Headquarters were removed to New York, and at the World's Fair at Philadelphia in 1876 the organization was formally dissolved. Like Swedish Charles, it

. . . left a name at which the world grew pale,
To point a moral or adorn a tale.

The present moral is, of course, quite obvious. It is two-fold. One part is, that political and social bogies are generally not nearly as formidable as they seem. Neither the "*Internationale*" nor May-day which grew out of it ever really menaced government or social order. The other part is the familiar fact that the radicals of to-day are the conservatives of to-morrow. That which is wise and good in the radicalism is accepted, while that which is foolish or vicious fails and perishes. The "*Internationale*" demanded Government ownership of railroads, and the Governments cried "Revolution! Anarchy!" But pretty soon those very Governments adopted that very principle, and they now regard it as one of the great bulwarks of their conservative strength against radicalism and anarchy. It demanded the abolition of inheritance of property, and the demand was and is vain. Perhaps it will be profitable to give a few minutes of thought to these things on May-day, and to consider whether some of the movements and demands which to-day seem so formidable and disquieting are not likely to complete their history on lines parallel with those of the "*Internationale*."

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNPERFORMANCE

THE problem of the unemployed is big. Of that there is no doubt. So, too, is the problem of the unperformed; and of the two it may be that the latter is the larger. If a thousand men in a community are unemployed, they and their dependents suffer, but not necessarily anybody else. But if the work of a thousand men remains unperformed, the whole community may suffer. That a vast volume of urgently desirable work remains undone, to the great loss of the public, is not to be denied. Complaints of the fact are widely heard. Indeed, it seems not injudicious to estimate that the complaints of unperformed work are comparable in number and earnestness with those of unemployed labor. The great trades and industries may have all the workers they need, but they are by no means the only potential or actual employers.

In every city, and in every rural region, there are public works which for the public welfare need to be performed. Take as a single example the matter of roads. There are all over this country uncounted thousands of miles of poor and positively

bad roads, not only in purely rural, but also in suburban regions. It would be for the public good to have them improved; not merely for convenience and comfort, but also for pecuniary profit. Yet the roads lie unimproved, and the innumerable public is subjected to inconvenience, discomfort, and loss; and at the same time able-bodied men, capable of doing the work of improving them, remain idle.

There are extensive areas of land, both rural and suburban, lying unoccupied, unimproved, and unproductive, which might be made sources of profit to workers and of benefit to the whole public. The Eastern States, particularly, contain great numbers of abandoned or more or less neglected farms which some years ago were prosperous and profitable and which might easily be restored to that former condition. Nearly every considerable city, too, is surrounded by a zone of territory which once was profitably used for agriculture and horticulture, but which now is in process of "development" for building purposes and therefore is abandoned for its former uses. There are thousands of acres which have thus been laid out in blocks and staked out in lots, but which have lain for years without any building operations upon them and will doubtless remain thus unimproved for years to come. The cultivation of these farms and lots would pay the cultivators a profit, and would add to our city market supplies in a way which would materially lessen the cost of living to the general public. Yet they lie idle, while able-bodied men capable of cultivating them are also idle.

There is also the domestic-service problem. This has long been regarded with a measure of hopelessness, and through counsels of despair it has been so abandoned that as a result our mode of life and social organization have largely been transformed. There are thousands of families which reluctantly and regretfully gave up individual houses and went into "apartments," or who still more reluctantly abandoned housekeeping altogether and went into hotels to live, because of the impossibility of securing satisfactory domestic help, and who would gladly return to their former and decidedly preferable form of life if such help could be assured. They have sacrificed some of the best features of domesticity, and they have greatly increased their cost of living, because they can get nobody to do the necessary work; while at the same time there are multitudes of women complaining of and actually suffering because of unemployment.

The situation thus presented is grossly illogical, as well as

economically wasteful and unsound. The problem involved may be stated in something like mathematical terms. There is a certain amount of work to be done. There is also a certain number of workers. The work should be so apportioned that each worker shall have a due share of employment, and the remuneration for that share should be sufficient at least to pay a living wage. We cannot concede that there are more workers to be employed than there is work to be done. Nature abhors a vacuum. She also abhors idleness. That "the world owes every man a living" is in one sense, the sense of the idler and parasite, untrue. The world owes no man anything that he does not earn. But unless we are to count men no better than the plants and animals which in their repletion overcrowd and suffocate or devour one another, we must concede that nature means that every man shall have an opportunity to earn a living. There is work enough to be done to provide all with employment, and there is profit enough in the work to provide all the workers with adequate sustenance. To argue otherwise would be to impeach the humane economy of creation.

The key to the solution of this dual problem of unemployment and unperformance lies, then, in two words: Distribution and Adaptation. It is notorious that there is congestion of workers in certain places, while there is lack of them in other places. When the Mountain would not go to Mohammed, Mohammed went to the Mountain. The work cannot come to the workers, but the workers must go to the work. The unemployed multitudes must in some way be transferred to the scene of unperformance. Again, it is equally notorious and equally true that some occupations are overcrowded while in others there is a scarcity of labor. Here, similarly, the work cannot adapt itself to the workers, but the workers must adapt themselves to the work. If the unemployed cannot find work at something which they like, they must learn to like that at which they can find it.

We are well aware that these processes of distribution and adaptation are not easily to be effected; though perhaps the difficulty will prove to be less than some have imagined. They may not be altogether agreeable to their subjects. There are many who prefer city life and who dislike the idea of going into the country. But if they are confronted with the alternative of unemployment in the city or profitable employment in the country, their decision should not be doubtful nor delayed.

So, too, there are young men who would rather be in trades or "business" than on farms, and there are young women who would rather be employed in offices or shops or factories than engage in domestic service. But if the alternative is idleness and poverty, on the one hand, or employment and competence on the other, what should the choice be?

If philanthropists and publicists and sociologists will make these rational views of the case clear and will encourage the army of the unemployed to choose promptly and aright, and if they will also facilitate the agreeable and successful pursuit of the chosen courses, they will find the way opening for a solution of the problem. We speak of encouragement and facilitation because we believe that some of the most important occupations which now suffer from unperformance are subject to undeserved prejudice, and also are invested with certain undesirable conditions which might and should be removed. Women object to entering domestic service because they dislike to be called "servants," and young men similarly eschew agriculture for fear of being considered louts and "hayseeds." Let these unmerited slurs upon worthy and necessary vocations be removed, and the vocations themselves be freed, as they readily may, from their unnecessarily distasteful features, and we shall no longer see them boycotted by those who would rather starve in idleness than live in comfort in kitchens and on farms.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON IMMIGRATION

THE effects of the war upon European immigration to this country, which we have hitherto discussed prospectively in these pages, are now sufficiently revealed to provide a basis for confident estimate; for the forecast already made appears to be substantially justified. There are now at hand statistics of migration to and from the United States for the first half of the present fiscal year, which corresponds with the second half of the last calendar year, from July 1 to December 31, 1915. The war started at the beginning of August, so that the half-year covers the first five months of it.

As was to be expected, migration from the belligerent countries has practically ceased. That from Scandinavia at the north and from Italy—especially Southern Italy—and Greece at the south has continued, though with some most suggestive modifications, much more marked in the latter than in the former. Indeed, the change caused by the war in the

volume of immigration from the northern countries has thus far been almost negligible; scarcely greater than the fluctuations from year to year before the war began. The total immigration to this country from those sources in the six months was 80,068. If we multiply that number by two we get 160,136 for a whole year at the same rate. Now the figures for the fiscal year 1911-1912, from the same countries, were 193,702, so that the decline due to the war, if it be entirely due to it, is about 17 per cent. That is a considerable decline, but it is by no means extraordinary, and might readily be attributable to other causes in a time of profound peace.

The immigration from Southern Italy and Greece during the same period was only 37,206, or at the rate of 74,412 for a full year. In the year 1911-1912 it was 167,396; so that the war has apparently caused a decline of more than 55 per cent., or more than three times as great as that in the case of the northern countries. That is not surprising; since we may safely estimate the expectation of Italy and Greece being dragged into the war to be more than three times as great as the similar expectation or fear concerning Scandinavia, and the moral, legal, and other restraint upon emigration to be correspondingly greater.

Perhaps still more suggestive are the statistics for the same period and the same regions of migration in the opposite direction—the refluant tide of emigration from America back to Europe. In the case of the northern countries this was 19,590, or 24.3 per cent. of the immigration, showing a net settlement in this country of 60,478 in six months. That was at the rate of 39,180 emigration in a full year, against 38,717 in 1911-12, or about 20 per cent. The increase of proportionate return migration from 20 per cent. to 24.3 per cent. may be regarded as negligible. But in the case of the southern countries what do we find. While only 37,206 persons came hither, no fewer than 84,300 returned to Europe; or 226.6 per cent.—more than two and a quarter times as many as those who came hither. There was thus a net loss in that element of our population of 47,094. That emigration was, moreover, at the rate of 168,600 a year. It is true that the return tide of this element has always been much larger than that of the northerners. Thus in 1911-12, while 167,396 came hither, 110,204, or 65.8 per cent., returned. But the figures of a year at war-rates show the percentage increased from 65.8 to 226.6. If the figures for the last half-year are repeated in the present half-year there

will have returned to Europe in 1914-15 more than a thousand more than the entire number that came hither in 1911-12.

This contrast between the two parts of Europe becomes the more significant when we remember that while in 1883 fully 95 per cent. of our entire European immigration came from the northern and western countries, in 1912 fully 70 per cent. came from the southern and eastern. As a result of, or at least during, the war there has been so marked a reaction that, in the six months which we are considering, instead of 70 per cent. from the south and east, we received of our gross immigration 68 per cent. from the north and west. Far more striking still are the figures of net immigration. Less than one-fourth of the number of northerners returned, while more than two and a quarter times the number of southerners did so. The result was a net immigration all told of only 12,844, to which the net immigration from north and west bore the proportion of 488 per cent.

We shall not be convicted of invidious prejudice if we say frankly that in these facts is cause for sincere satisfaction. It is indisputable that immigrants from the northwestern countries are decidedly preferable to those from the southeastern. Their morals are better. Their average of literacy and of general intelligence is far higher. Their physical condition is much better. Their pecuniary and other material resources are greater, and their industrial potency is also greater. To this we may add that their civic usefulness is superior, since they far more generally become citizens and remain here as permanent residents. One unpleasant characteristic of many of the immigrants from the south and east of Europe has been the fact that they would not become citizens, that they sent the chief part of their savings back to the old country, and that after a stay sometimes measured by months and at most by a few years, they would return home to live upon what they had earned and saved here. Such sojourners are of little value and of much loss to this country. Better a single one who becomes naturalized, spends the rest of his life here, and reinvests here the capital which he accumulates here, than a dozen who regard America as a mere Tom Tiddler's Ground upon which to pick up money to carry away with them to their old home. If the marked tendencies in immigration which have been developed in the last nine months shall continue, not only during the remainder of the war, but also after the return of peace, this country may be the loser in mere numbers, but it will assuredly be

greatly the gainer in the substantial stuff of which good citizenry is composed.

COMMENT

It seems that there was no occasion for Secretary Tumulty to wave aside the Chicago election as "purely local," after all. Keen analysis shows that the intrenched Democracy held its own. The *World's* statistician, in fact, figures out a substantial gain in this way:

Comparing the straight Democratic vote of Tuesday, 162,155 (not counting women), with Wilson's vote of 120,000 in 1912 and Bryan's vote of 143,000 in 1908, it will be seen that nothing has collapsed in Chicago except Harrisonism.

That seems conclusive. Moreover, as the *World* points out, in 1912 Roosevelt and Taft combined "had 212,000 against Wilson's 120,000," a majority of 92,000; and yet Wilson carried the State. Excellent! But wait a minute. The vote in Illinois for Roosevelt and Taft combined was 640,000 against 405,000 for Wilson, and the Republican majority in Chicago this year was 149,000 against the "combined" plurality of 92,000 in 1912, an increase of 60 per cent. Upon this ratio the united opposition would carry Illinois by the comfortable majority of 394,000 and the country by a most uncomfortable plurality of 2,097,000. And why should not the women, who cast 136,000 votes for the Republicans against 86,000 for the Democrats in Chicago, "be counted"? They are going to vote next year, aren't they? Upon the whole, we prefer to adhere to Mr. Tumulty's interpretation as the more judicious and consoling.

Writing to the *World* regarding that faithful journal's assertion that Mr. Paul M. Warburg "had more to do with the actual drafting of the Federal Reserve law than any other man either in Congress or out of Congress," Representative Carter Glass says:

This utterly erroneous statement in your editorial of Saturday is only comparable to an assertion made some time ago by Mr. Harvey in THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, to the effect that the House Currency bill was "so radically changed by the Senate as to bear little resemblance to the law as enacted." Such a declaration betrays indefensible ignorance. It is based upon the fact that the Senate made various changes of phraseology in the House bill and some very

radical alterations of its essentials; but had Mr. Harvey troubled himself to pursue the course of legislation he would have seen that the House conferees restored every single important feature of the House bill and discarded every fundamental change made by the Senate.

What we really really said—in October—was that “the new law bears little resemblance to the original so-called Administration Bill”—*i.e.*, to the bill as first introduced in the House, not as passed by it—and—in February—that “while the law was fully enacted by the Democrats, its genesis was Republican and the ‘idea’ was hatched in the brain of Grandfather Nelson W. Aldrich.” While desirous of according to Mr. Glass full credit for the quite essential part which he performed in achieving this excellent legislation, we are convinced that each of these statements, so far from evidencing “indefensible ignorance,” is susceptible of proof. The *World*, whose terseness is occasionally more pronounced than its accuracy, must take care of itself.

It was only a question of time when the ceaselessly active Collector Dudley Field Malone would take a hand in the great war. For eight long, weary months ominous silence was disturbed only by champing at the bit, but indomitable energy finally found a way. Somebody told the vigilant official that an empty tomato-can had been found floating upon the turgid waters of the Lower Bay. This was more than suspicious; it was tangible evidence of a plot to supply British warships with things to eat, quite contrary to our highly prized neutrality. But there should be no question as to the facts. So the Collector requisitioned an ocean-going tug, donned a cap fashioned after Our First Lord's, put all the lights on the blink, and sallied forth in the dead of several nights. True, he found no more tomato-cans, but he saw where they had been and so informed an eager press, which responded promptly with the customary head-lines. But, alas, other officials betrayed a lamentable lack of understanding of Democratic team-work. Counselor Robert Lansing, of the State Department, calmly remarked that there had been no violation of neutrality since September, and District-Attorney Marshall indicated that he “would rather not say anything about the case,” as the facts in his possession were “not numerous.” Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Peters also intimated that it might have been as well for the Collector to report to the Department before hurling his discoveries into print, and took

a train for New York, looking very weary. But Mr. Field Malone, recalling the President's flattering observation that he "generally knows what he is talking about," manfully declared:

I know that Mr. Peters is coming, but I also know that his visit has no connection with the neutrality situation. Mr. Lansing is hardly in a position to know as accurately as I what violations are going on at this port. While Mr. Lansing is entitled to his opinion, I am interested in facts. My duties as Collector are clear and distinct, and I shall continue to protect this port's neutrality, whether it is being violated in the interests of the British, the French, or the Germans. The neutrality we are protecting is American.

That is the last heard of it, and we suppose the incident may be considered closed. Nevertheless, we venture the opinion that people hereabouts rest more confidently with knowledge that a Young Sleuth is watching over them, and even Our Colonel should rejoice at hearing from this supine Administration the firm and patriotic declaration that "the neutrality we are protecting is American." Oh dear! oh dear!

Treaties are worse than worthless unless fulfilled; for a treaty is only a promise, and it is far better never to make a promise than lightly to make it and lightly to break it.—COLONEL ROOSEVELT.

So they say in Colombia.

Secretary Daniels considers it beneath his dignity to reply to such criticisms.—*Washington Dispatch*.

Beneath *what*?

Why not Penrose for President?